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The intersection of art and obscenity has long been a source of
intrigue in light of the ever-changing nature of artistic movements
and contemporary standards.
The focus of the heated debate,
however, is seldom placed on the effect that the artistic medium has
on the tendency of courts and audiences to find a particular work
obscene.' More specifically, the question of whether modern forms of
art, such as photography, are more susceptible to obscenity charges by
nature of intrinsic characteristics of the medium itself is an
interesting one left relatively unexplored.
In order to warrant the protection of the First Amendment, it
appears that sexually explicit photographs must possess an artistic
value beyond that required for more traditional forms of art. But
what of the Post-Modern art photographer who wishes to defy all
standards and propose that something an average person might
mistake as a "non-artistic" snapshot, or a page from a pornographic
magazine, is art? Is a sexually explicit photograph somehow more
likely to be found to be obscene than a sexually explicit painting or
sculpture? If so, the art photographer would be more restricted in
producing sexually explicit work than the traditional painter or
sculptor.
This varied standard, though invisible on paper, is
ultimately harmful to the photographer as artist, the advancement of
photography as art, and the public audience that will not be able to
experience this art. In the realm of obscenity law, courts and
audiences alike must strive to place photography on equal footing with
other forms of art despite the complications that arise with
photography as a distinct and often problematic literal medium of
expression.
Part I of this article describes the initial hurdles that all visual
art forms, including photography, face with respect to First
Amendment protection given the power of visual imagery and the
2
three-pronged test for obscenity set forth in Miller v. California. Of

1.
See, e.g., Amy Adler, The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205 (2000)
[hereinafter Adler, Art of Censorship] (arguing that the First Amendment offers greater
protection over verbal rather than visual expression, but not suggesting that there is
varied protection over different types of visual images); Cara L. Newman, Eyes Wide Open,
Minds Wide Shut: Art, Obscenity, and the First Amendment in Contemporary America, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 121 (2003) (charging that the First Amendment fails to adequately protect
Post-Modern artists but not differentiating between various artistic media); Amy M. Adler,
Note, Post-Modern Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359 (1990)
[hereinafter Adler, Death of Obscenity Law] (emphasizing that the Miller standard of
"serious artistic value" is obsolete in the world of Post-Modern art because the new art in
general rebels against that standard).
2.
413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that state courts should
look to the following three guidelines for determining whether a work is obscene:

2006]

EQUAL PROTECTIONINARTAND OBSCENITY

particular relevance is the "serious artistic value" prong of the Miller
test and the problems inherent in determining who is to judge as well
as how one might judge whether a work, particularly a photograph
that may be construed to have a non-artistic function, possesses
"serious artistic value." 3
Part II addresses the overall approach to photography in three
distinct areas of the law outside of obscenity: copyright, privacy, and
child pornography. In each of these areas, courts and parties to
disputes have demonstrated a bias against photography based on its
visual and mechanical nature. This biased approach to photography
in other areas of the law translates into the tendency of courts to view
photography differently within the scope of obscenity law. Part III
expands upon the obstacles inherent in photography by exploring the
multi-functional nature of photography and its marginalization in art
history. The emergence of photography as an art form is a relatively
modern phenomenon that effectuates a higher standard for proving
that a photograph possesses "serious artistic value" for purposes of the
4
Miller test.
Further exploring the complexity of photography as an artistic
medium, Part IV focuses on the effect of photography as a means of
capturing objective truth. Because a photograph is perceived as more
real than a painting or sculpture, courts and audiences are more likely
to find provocative photographs to be obscene. A sexually explicit
photograph that is perceived as accurately depicting a real subject or
action that took place in an actual moment of time may have a higher
probability of appealing to the "prurient interest" or of being "patently
offensive." 5 Combined with the problems in proving that photography
has "serious artistic value,"6 these tendencies render photography
more easily perceived as "obscene" than other forms of art. Finally,
Part V anticipates the need to apply effectively an equal standard for
what constitutes obscenity across all art forms in recognition of
photography's value as an artistic medium.

a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3.
Id. at 24.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.

6.

Id.
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I. VISUAL ART AND THE MILLER TEST: INITIAL HURDLES TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION

The Supreme Court has long held that certain content, such as
obscenity, does not fall within the scope of absolute First Amendment
protection.7 Because material such as obscene sexual content falls
outside the realm of protected speech, legislatures can enact statutes
that either limit or ban such obscene content.8
The question,
therefore, becomes which works are obscene and which works are not
obscene, and the answer dictates whether the particular work can be
censored in some manner. In Miller v. California,the Supreme Court
ruled that courts should look to the following three guidelines for
determining whether a work is obscene:
a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and c) whether the
work, taken as a
9
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

As a starting point, photography faces two challenges with
respect to First Amendment protection. First, it is a visual art and
the visual arts arguably garner less First Amendment protection than
verbal speech. 10 Second, it is difficult to determine when photography
exhibits serious artistic value for purposes of Miller's third prong.
Additionally, under Miller it is unclear when a work of art has serious
11
artistic value and who should make that determination.
Furthermore, contemporary artistic movements such as the PostModernist movement often deliberately seek to defy the notion that an

7.
E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (verifying the rejection of
obscenity in the history of the First Amendment and defining it as "utterly without
redeeming social importance").
8.
Cf. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21-25 (reaffirming the Roth decision and outlining a
three-pronged test for defining obscenity based on contemporary community standards).
9.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10.
See Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note 1 (identifying this problem for art as
part of the larger problem of greater First Amendment protection over verbal as opposed to
visual speech).
11.
See generally Christine Haight Farley, JudgingArt, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005)
(examining "the extent to which the law makes aesthetic judgments" and the need for
courts to recognize and "import" the complex discourse on what constitutes art); Newman,
supra note 1, at 145 ("From a critical perspective, [the notion that good art is
distinguishable from bad art] may be an impossible distinction to make because, before one
can dismiss an image or performance as 'bad' art or 'non-art,' one must know what 'art'
is."); Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1375-78 (identifying practical ways
courts can determine whether a work is art rather than trying to answer the "exhaustive"
philosophical query of what "art" is).
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artistic work must possess conventional artistic value. 12 These initial
obstacles arise even before a consideration of how photography differs
from other art forms, and they only serve to heighten the burden on
art photographers' freedom of expression. Although these challenges
are not specific to photography as an artistic medium, artistic
photography is a critical example of a form of expression that faces
both challenges.
A. The Power of the Image
Visual imagery can evoke powerful emotions and reactions that
render it distinct from (or simply unparalleled by) other forms of
expression. The adage that a picture is worth a thousand words finds
its root in the idea that images have the ability to communicate in a
uniquely powerful and effective way. Even the Supreme Court has
suggested that images have a specific potent quality in that they act
as a "short cut from mind to mind." 13 With respect to the First
Amendment, the question has been raised as to whether it makes
sense that art, with "its force beyond words, its power and its
irrationality," 14 is protected at all, given that the underlying rationale
15
of the First Amendment is to foster a marketplace of rational ideas.
Additionally, there exists the argument that visual images are
somehow dangerous given their power over human emotion and
behavior. 16 As Professor Amy Adler keenly observes:
The seductive quality of artistic images, their appeal to the senses and the
emotions, has been a recurring justification in the complex and centuries-old
history of iconoclasm, censorship, and suppression of art. The voluptuousness of
art, its power beyond words, the possibility that it could be worshipped, fetishized,
or misinterpreted, paved the way for both adulation and censorship. This view, of
course, helps to explain why First Amendment law would devalue images: by
bypassing reason and appealing
directly to the senses, images fail to participate in
17
the marketplace of ideas.

Photography as an art form may in fact represent the epitome
of the power of images, particularly because a photograph is perceived
as capturing and revealing an objective truth to which individuals

12.
Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1359.
13.
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (commenting on the
power of visual images in the context of an emblem or flag); see Adler, Art of Censorship,
supra note 1, at 213-17 (illustrating the value of visual images in part through discussion
of the Supreme Court's flag and flag burning cases).
14.
Adler, Art of Censorship,supra note 1, at 205.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 211-13.
17.
Id. at 213.
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more easily relate. 18 It follows that offensive, powerful, or provocative
photographs might be considered more "dangerous" images, which,
applying Professor Adler's 'analysis, would warrant greater
censorship. 19 Yet even when disregarding the nature and effect of
photography specifically, the mere fact that it is a visual, rather than
a textual, form of expression places it on lower footing with respect to
First Amendment protection.20 Indeed, modern obscenity litigation
21
has focused exclusively on visual rather than textual material.
Furthermore, anti-pornography writing, namely that of Catharine
MacKinnon, suggests that pornographic photography is more harmful
and degrading to women than textual pornography. 22 Considering
these assertions on the power of visual imagery, photography, by
nature of its being visual rather than textual, faces an initial obstacle
to surviving obscenity litigation.
B. The Problem of "SeriousArtistic Value"
The second general obstacle photography faces by nature of
being an "art" relates to the third prong of the Miller test. Even if a
work of art satisfies the first two prongs of the test, the work is not
deemed obscene under Miller unless it also lacks "serious artistic
value." 23 But what exactly is art, and who gets to decide what it is? If
art is a means of self-expression and a critical medium for creative
development, new ideas and progress, then art's sole constant may
indeed be change. As a result, a single true and accurate definition of
art would be ever-fleeting. 24 Moreover, reasonable minds differ on
what is and is not "aesthetic" for purposes of art. Perhaps more
accurately, art is more often than not meant to defy reason entirely
and appeal to one's passion. 25 It is therefore meant to be open to
18.

See infra Part IV.

19.
See Adler, Art of Censorship,supra note 1, at 210.
20.
Id.; cf. Rudolf Arnheim, The Images of Pictures and Words, 2 WORD & IMAGE
306, 306-07 (1986) (discussing the power of images to dominate an experience that is both
visual and verbal because images are transmitted directly, while speech is an "indirect
medium").
21.
Adler, Art of Censorship,supra note 1, at 210.
22.
See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); CATHARINE A.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
23.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
24.
See, e.g., Newman, supra note 1, at 156-58 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
First Amendment framework for obscenity determinations as insufficiently protective of
controversial Contemporary art which challenges current social norms).
25.
See Adler, Art of Censorship,supra note 1, at 213; see also Renee Linton, The
Artistic Voice: Is it in Danger of Being Silenced?, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 195, 195 (1995)
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interpretation depending on each individual's own emotional
reaction. 26 Furthermore, not all art is intended to be aesthetic or even
fully interpretable. 27 Post-Modern art, for example, derives its value
from defying past standards and expanding beyond the traditional
boundaries of art, often attempting deliberately to shock and blatantly
offend audiences. 28 Perhaps most importantly for purposes of current
obscenity law, not all art has serious artistic value.29 Therefore, First
Amendment jurisprudence with respect to obscenity is riddled with
the general dilemma of how to determine what art is in the first place,
and how to reconcile the third prong of Miller with the idea that some
legitimate art may, by its very character, purposely lack serious
artistic value in the conventional sense.
The "serious artistic value" standard arguably becomes even
more problematic when applied to photography. To the extent that
photography was not historically considered an "art" and is still seen
today as having multiple "non-artistic" functions, 30 it is harder to
prove
that
provocative
photographs
teetering
on
the
"art/non-art" divide have serious artistic value. In this sense, the art
photographer not only is restricted by the same challenges regarding
serious artistic value that confront all other artists, but additionally is
restricted by the medium of photography itself.
Yet this difficulty in defining and judging art constitutes only
half of the problem with the serious artistic value standard. The other
half of this looming issue concerns the questions of who should
determine whether a work is "art," and if determined to be "art,"
whether or not it possesses serious artistic value. Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes's famous quote in the 1903 case of Bleistein v.
(supporting government funding of the arts and making the opening statement that "[g]ood

art moves your emotions or makes you think," though emphasizing that "good" art
encompasses "disliked" art and that all art "deserves both our attention and our
protection" (quoting Julie Ann Alagna, 1991 Legislation, Reports and Debates Over
Federally Funded Art: Arts Community Left with an "Indecent"Compromise, 48 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1545, 1545 (1991))).
26.
Cf. Linton, supra note 25, at 195 ("Art does not have to be liked or beautiful or
innocent to be art. It must, however, be seen or heard, and it must strike your soul, your
mind or both." (quoting Alagna, supra note 25, at 1545)).
27.
Id. This statement was derived from the quote in the previous footnote, that not
all art must be "liked or beautiful."
28.
See Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1369-75 (denouncing the
Miller test as inadequate for protecting Post-Modern art such as the works of Karen Finley,
Annie Sprinkle, Robert Mapplethorpe and Richard Kern, all of which seek to rebel against
traditional notions of art and therefore often shock, offend or insult the common public).
29.
See id. at 1359 (introducing the dilemma that Miller came at a turning point in
art history, and that the new Post-Modern art rendered the third prong of the test
obsolete).
30.
See infra Part III.
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Donaldson Lithographing Co., that "it would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,"31
reveals the sentiment that it is not the role of judges to evaluate the
legitimacy of art or to make aesthetic determinations. 32 That is, it is
not up to judges to determine what is and is not "art." Courts,
however, are not always apt to pay heed to Holmes's admonition.
Some judges do make themselves out to be arbiters of art, subjecting
more questionable works of art to their own whims and notions of
what warrants constitutional protection. 33
Judges are not the only art viewers who may allow their own
preconceived notions affect a case's outcome; the jury also acts as a
critical audience. In Pope v. Illinois, the Supreme Court announced a
reasonable person standard for Miller's third prong.3 4 In determining
whether a work has serious artistic value, a jury should ask itself how
a reasonable person would evaluate the work as a whole rather than
inquiring into what an average person in a given community would
think.35 While expert testimony may be used to help the trier of fact
make this determination, 36 it is not required, 37 and the opinion of art

31.
188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
32.
Id. Justice Holmes added: "At the one extreme, some works of genius would be
sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public
had learned the new language in which their author spoke." Id.
33.
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 111 n.1 (2d Cir.
1998) (providing extensive background on the artistic origins of the pose in question in a
prominent fair use case); Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1970) (ruling
a photographic magazine obscene because the pictures contained in it reflected no attempt
at artistic composition), vacated, Miller v. United States, 413 U.S. 913 (1973); People v.
Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1951) (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a
prosecution for violation of the state obscenity statute because the works in question were
"not even good photography" and therefore no argument could be made that they
constituted art).
34.
481 U.S. 497, 501 (1987).
35.
Id. at 500-01.
36.
See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 137 (11th Cir. 1992)
(noting expert testimony as to the serious artistic value of the lyrics of the song in
question); United States v. Ten Erotic Paintings, 432 F.2d 420, 420 (4th Cir. 1970)
(acknowledging the weight of affidavits filed by claimants in which art experts, including
critics and museum curators, certified the works in question and their authors, deeming
that the works possessed artistic, historic and anthropological merit); Tipp-It, Inc. v.
Conboy, 596 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Neb. 1999) (deferring to the single expert witness's
testimony in the case to conclude that the works lacked serious artistic value under the
various expert analyses proposed); Elizabeth Hess, Art on Trial: Cincinnati's Dangerous
Theater of the Ridiculous, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Oct. 23, 1990, at 111-12 (reporting on the
famous trial involving Robert Mapplethorpe's controversial works and the effectiveness of
expert testimony in convincing the jury to acquit the Contemporary Art Center and its
director).
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experts and critics is not necessarily determinative under Pope's
reasonable person standard.3 8 Critics of the Pope majority warn that
the reasonable person standard exacerbates the difficulties that lie in
the "serious artistic value" prong. 39 As Justice Stevens warns in his
dissent, the reasonable person standard poses a greater threat to
unpopular or misunderstood art because juries may be more inclined
to neglect the testimony of art experts, thinking a reasonable person
would evaluate art differently than would an art critic. 40 While art
experts may use more defined analyses such as a subjective "fourcorners" test or objective "Dickey" analysis to determine whether a
work possesses serious artistic value, 41 the Pope standard subjects
controversial art to more popular, and often more limiting, concepts of
42
art and artistic value.
All of this suggests that current First Amendment
jurisprudence and standards of obscenity render the preconceived
notions and popular perceptions of art by the public extremely
relevant to the analysis. This is particularly important for the
discussion regarding artistic photography's distinct impact on
audiences and how it results in a greater likelihood that a provocative
photograph will be considered obscene. 43 Sexually explicit artistic
photography must therefore grapple with a variety of issues that
affect photography as well as the category of visual arts as a whole:
the inherent power of visual imagery, the requirement that it meet the
problematic "serious artistic value" prong of Miller, and the influence
of public views on art versus that of experts. Photography, as a subset
of the visual arts, is therefore disadvantaged from the start. These
overarching obstacles are only the beginning of the rocky road that art
37.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973) (regarding
consideration of the works in and of themselves sufficient for the determination of the
question of obscenity).
38.
See Adler, Death of Obscenity Law, supra note 1, at 1372-73 (criticizing Pope as
an "extremely dangerous" standard because it devalues expert testimony and therefore
may further threaten sexually explicit Post-Modern artists).
39.
Id.
40.
Pope, 481 U.S. at 512-13 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41.
The subjective "four-corners" test evaluates specific criteria such as space,
composition, design, color, harmony, and form and balance, while the objective "Dickey"
analysis takes into account where the art has been exhibited and the degree of respect and
recognition in the art world that the work or artist has attained. See Conboy, 596 N.W.2d
at 314 (discussing the expert witness's consideration of the two analyses used by art
experts).
42.
See Newman, supra note 1, at 151 (denouncing courts' belief that ordinary and
reasonable men and women are best able to evaluate a sexually explicit work's artistic
value because the general public often regards art with suspicion, and may therefore
"condemn a work as obscene based on superficial content alone").
43.
See infra Parts III and IV.
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photographers must travel in their struggle for equal treatment under
the First Amendment. These obstacles also lay the foundation for the
more medium-specific explanations of why sexually explicit
photography may more readily be found to be obscene that the
following sections explore.
II. THE EFFECT OF ARTISTIC MEDIUM ON LEGAL BIASES: THE LAW'S
DISTINCT APPROACH TO PHOTOGRAPHY OUTSIDE OF OBSCENITY
While statutes and courts have not explicitly allocated a varied
obscenity standard based on artistic medium nor expressly indicated
that photography shall be treated as a lesser art that is more likely to
be considered obscene, certain areas of the law outside of obscenity
suggest an overall legal bias against photography. These legal areas
help to reveal the general approach to photography taken by
lawmakers and courts as being distinct from other vehicles for
expression.
Evidence of bias in copyright, privacy and child
pornography law demonstrates the likelihood that this distinct
approach to photography extends from those realms into obscenity
jurisprudence.
Such evidence also supports the proposition that
photography is simply treated differently by the law.
This
unfavorable bias has far-reaching consequences for art photographers
who produce sexually explicit work.
A. Photographyand Copyright Law
The intersection of photography and copyright law came to a
head in the prominent 1884 Supreme Court case of Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.4 4 Although best known for its
determinations about the originality standard central to copyright
law, what is most important and relevant to the current analysis is
that the case specifically resolved the issue of whether a photograph
could be deemed to be the original product of an author (which would
make it eligible for copyright protection). 45 The details of BurrowGiles highlight photography's troubled development as an art form.
Citing photography's mechanical nature and the charge that a
photograph is merely the product of a soulless machine, the alleged
44.
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
45.
Id. at 60; see Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's
Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 386 (2004).
Photographers did not seek out copyright protection until two decades after photography
was invented, at which time only several of the most successful portraitists - including
Mathew Brady, Napoleon Sarony, and Benjamin J. Falk - exhibited such progressive
boldness. Farley, supra, at 402.
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infringer argued that the work was not that of an author and that it
therefore failed the basic requirement for copyright protection. 46 This
argument essentially tracks the historical criticisms of photography as
an artistic medium that became the foundation of its struggle for
47
establishment as "art."
The mere fact that differences between photography and other
forms of art were so prominently considered in Burrow-Giles shows
that there was a tendency for the Court to take an alternative
approach to photography. 48 While the Court ultimately ruled that the
work, the famous photographic portrait of Oscar Wilde, was indeed
the work of an author rather than a machine, it used a different
approach from that which it would have used to find authorship in a
painting or other form of art.49 The necessity of taking the "human
trace" 50 approach to justifying copyright of a photograph, rather than
the more traditional labor or innovation justifications used to support
copyright of paintings and other forms of art, reveals that, despite the
outcome of the case, there was still an underlying belief (or at least
constructive acknowledgment) that photography's inherent differences
somehow had to be accommodated in order to reach the most
appropriate decision. This accommodation under copyright law is
dangerous in its relation to obscenity law. If photography is treated
differently under copyright law, it might be afforded similar
accommodation under the First Amendment; yet a varied approach
would likely work to the disadvantage of sexually explicit
photography, particularly given the common perception
of
51
objective.
starkly
photography as being
Another important copyright case involving a photograph,
Gross v. Seligman,52 further demonstrates that, despite the general
46.
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56; see Farley,supra note 45, at 402-03.
47.
See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58-59 (acknowledging the defense's contrasting of
engravings, paintings, and prints from photographs in that the former media "embody the
intellectual conception of its author, in which there is novelty, invention, originality," while
the latter is merely the mechanical reproduction of an object, in which there is no
originality or novelty); see also supra note 45.
48.
See id. at 58-59, 61.
49.
See Farley, supra note 45, at 426-28 (recognizing that the Court, in order to
reach its result of finding authorship in photography, could not rely on more traditional
rationalizations for copyright such as acknowledging labor involved in producing the work
or innovation required to create the work, but rather had to focus on the "human trace" in
photography).
50.
Id. at 427.
51.
See infra Part IV (discussing an additional obstacle to equal protection given
the inherent realness of a photograph and the effect of this perceived fidelity to reality on a
viewer's reaction to sexually explicit photographs).
52.
212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914).
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acceptance that photography warrants copyright protection, there
persists an underlying bias against it. This is evidenced by the
proposition that, despite the language in the opinion, 53 the Second
Circuit's decision and rationale in the case were influenced by the fact
that the artistic medium involved was photography. In Gross, the
original photographer sold his copyright in a nude photographic
portrait and then later used the same model in a similar pose for a
photographic portrait under a different title. 54 The court ruled that
the production of the second work was an infringement on the
copyright of the first because there was strong indication that the
artist used his talents not to produce another portrait, but rather to
55
duplicate the original.
While the Gross opinion begins with a reference to BurrowGiles and suggests that the court is treating the photographic work in
the same way it would have treated a painting,56 the fact that the case
involved a photograph still seems significant. Given the historic
criticism of photographs as being merely products of a machine and
copies of reality, it is conceivable that if the court believed that
photographs were easier to replicate than paintings, it may have had
a dislike for the actions of the original photographer. In other words,
the court may have wanted to prevent the cheapening of copyright by
disallowing the artist to take a second bite of the apple, but the court
desired to come to its result even more because of the perceived ease of
re-photographing something. This may explain why the court avoided
attaching any significance to the fact that the second photograph had
a distinct title, "Cherry Ripe," that may have been a creative and
original commentary on the first photograph, "Grace-of Youth." 57 Such
an analysis may have led the court to come to a different result based
on the fair use doctrine, 58 though the court did not address this
59
issue.
53.
See id. at 931.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. ("If the copyrighted picture were produced with colors on canvas, and were
then copyrighted and sold by the artist, he would infringe the purchaser's rights if
thereafter the same artist, using the same model, repainted the same picture with only
trivial variations of detail and offered it for sale.").
57.
See Silvers v. Russell, 113 F. Supp. 119, 123-24 (S.D. Cal. 1953); see also Justin
Hughes, The PersonalityInterests of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L.J. 81, 127 & n.178 (1998).
58.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). The fair use doctrine
has been developed as a defense to copyright infringement and allows works such as
parodies to survive copyright infringement claims. Courts consider four elements when
evaluating whether a work may be protected under the fair use doctrine: "(1) the purpose
and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and

2006]

EQUAL PROTECTIONINARTAND OBSCENITY

In the professional practice of photography, the general advice
given to photographers is to take caution when it comes to the issue of
copyright. 60 With respect to the fair use defense in copyright law, the
practical advice to photographers has been to seek as much legal help
as possible given the complexity of the area, despite the law's attempt
to define it.61 Photographers are also advised that the safest defense
to copyright lawsuits "is to introduce as many variations as are
artistically feasible in a photograph." 62 But could this be harder to
achieve for the photographer than for the painter? Arguably with
today's technology and the advent of digital photography, it would not
be.
Nonetheless, the perception that a photograph is a literal
translation of reality - and the law's notice of this perception - is an
inescapable one for the artistic photographer. The obstacles that a
photographer faces in obtaining copyright protection illustrate the
distinctiveness of photography as an art form, which proves
problematic beyond any single area of the law and likely transfers into
the area of obscenity.
B. Invasion of Privacy and the Release
Another area of the law that suggests a different approach to
photography is that involving privacy.
In the early days of
photography, when the medium met its harshest and most widespread
criticism, critics scorned photography as being "predatory with respect
to people." 63 Photographic discourse in the mid-to-late nineteenth
century on the invention's effect on modern society stressed its ability
to make things more visible to the masses. 64 Together, these general
sentiments laid a foundation for the intersection of photography and
privacy rights. If a photograph did indeed capture the reality of a
person, and if technology allowed such information to reach more
people, then it follows that invasion of privacy would become a greater
concern. The ease of taking a picture, the picture's ability to reflect
reality, and its dissemination in multiple facets of society and culture

substantiality of the work used, and (4) the effect of the use on the market value of the

original." Id. at 308; see also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
59.

Gross, 212 F. at 930-32.
See ROBERT M. CAVALLO & STUART KAHAN, PHOTOGRAPHY: WHAT'S THE LAW?
72-74 (2d ed. 1979).
60.

61.

See id.

62.
63.

CHRISTOPHER DU VERNET, PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE LAW 123 (2d ed. 1991).
SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 115 (7th prtg. 1978).

64.

See, e.g.,

MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY AND ITS CRITICS: A CULTURAL

HISTORY, 1839-1900 47 (1997).

126

VANDERBILT J. OFENTERTAINMENT AND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 9: 1:1

made it that much more dangerous to one's sense of privacy and
anonymity.
Issues on the right to privacy and the use of the release are
relevant here in that they reflect the uniqueness of photography as a
medium. After all, the development of laws recognizing the right to
privacy stemmed from the era of yellow journalism and excesses of the
press in the late 1800s and early 1900s, an era that was ultimately
65
made possible by the advent of photography and its widespread use.
The nation's first privacy law, embodied in sections fifty and fifty-one
of the New York Civil Rights Law, 66 was enacted as a response to the
public's outrage regarding a company's use of a woman's photograph
in advertising and the denial of a legal right to obtain damages for use
67
of the photograph.
Although New York's privacy statute does not differentiate
between different artistic media, 68 case law revealing the exceptions to
the statute shed light on the distinct approach to photography under
privacy law. Of particular relevance is the newsworthiness exception
to New York privacy law - that is, if the image is editorial or
newsworthy, it serves the public interest and falls outside the scope of
the privacy statute. 69 Because of its prevalent use in areas such as
journalism and the assumption that a photograph can provide the
most direct representation of an event or object of reality, photography
is more likely than other media to fall under this newsworthiness
exception. In this regard, photography deserves differential treatment
in the eyes of privacy law. Of course, this favorable differential
treatment does nothing to advance the category of artistic
photography, but rather protects only journalistic photography.
Whether these two types of photography should overlap and receive

65.
See Du VERNET, supra note 62, at 65-69, 75 (describing the importance of every
photographer's attention to the rights and obligations that lie in the area of privacy law
given that the development of the law on the matter, in the form of the country's first
privacy statute, was largely in response to a prominent dispute in New York involving

photography); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (lamenting the invasion of journalism into the lives and mental well-being
of individuals and calling for the extension of American law to protect the rights of private
individuals).
66.
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (2005).
67.
DU VERNET, supra note 62, at 66-67 (discussing Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902)).
68.
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50.
69.
See, e.g., Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984);
Arrington v. N.Y. Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319 (N.Y. 1982); Dallesandro v. Henry Hold & Co.,
166 N.Y.S.2d 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957); see Du VERNET, supra note 62, at 67 (advising the
professional photographer that although courts provide for a newsworthiness exception,
there are strict restrictions on the manner of obtaining photographs).

2006]

EQUAL PROTECTIONINARTAND OBSCENITY

the same protection is a separate issue beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, the newsworthiness exception in the law on privacy
rights is but one area that illustrates the law's response to the nature
of photography as a medium.
Another relevant aspect of the intersection of photography and
privacy law that suggests a distinct approach to photography on the
part of plaintiffs involves the New York Supreme Court case between
Erno Nussenzweig, a Hasidic Jewish man, and the internationallyacclaimed photographer Philip-Lorca diCorcia. 70 The photograph in
dispute, "#13" of a larger collection entitled "Heads," was taken by
diCorcia in Times Square and has since been sold in multiple prints
for roughly $20,000 each. 71 Nussenzweig sued pursuant to sections
fifty and fifty-one of the New York Civil Rights Law, which apply to
use of name or likeness regardless of artistic medium, and ultimately
lost in court. 72 One can argue, however, that the fact that this dispute
involved a photograph, rather than a painting or other art form, was
critical to the dispute's formation in the first place.
To start with, if this were a painted portrait, the subject would
have likely posed for it, and therefore have been aware of the intended
use of the work. It would be much harder, or even impossible, for the
painter.to create a work similar to "#13" without having the subject
right in front of him, or at least seeing him for longer than the split
second it takes to shoot a photograph. In other words, the immediacy
associated with taking a photograph was what allowed diCorcia to
capture the moment, and the technological capabilities of photography
allowed him to capture the image from a distance. Furthermore,
Nussenzweig's argument that he suffered "severe mental anguish,
emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment" 73 may have
seemed more believable given that his particular religion prohibits
him from being photographed.
Might these medium-specific
considerations, and the biased perception that a photograph is more
"real" and therefore more attached to the subject,74 have prompted
Nussenzweig to sue in the first place? Such a conjecture would be
much in line with the way early critics of photography found the

70.
See David Hafetz, What's a Picture Worth? He Wants $1.6 Mil, N.Y. POST, June
26, 2005, at 23.
71.
Id.
72.
Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, slip op. 50171(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
8, 2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006-50171.
htm.
73.
Hafetz, supra note 70 (quoting Nussenzweig's complaint).
74.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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medium so "predatory."75 In the end, Nussenzweig lost his case
because the court deemed that the privacy statute did not apply to the
photograph because it was a work of art. 76 However, one might still
wonder whether this outcome was a result of the fact that the work in
question was by a world-renowned photographer - and therefore a
respected artist whose primary goal was expression rather than profit
- and if it was that single consideration that tipped the scale in favor
of diCorcia. Given that photography historically has experienced
hurdles to being perceived as art, it may very well be that a lesserknown artist might not have been able to overcome these hurdles in
order to achieve the same legal outcome.
Courts struggle in their approach to photographs taken in
public places because the photographer is capturing what is already
open to public view. 77 The general consensus now is that there are
situations in which privacy laws apply even in public. 78 If this is the
case, the only way to get around using a photograph in trade or
advertising is to obtain the subject's written consent. 79 This is done
through the release.8 0 Yet in cases involving photography such as
diCorcia's, where the subject is meant to be anonymous and the
photograph is taken spontaneously without the subject's knowledge,
obtaining any sort of formal release is difficult and burdensome. The
use of the release is prevalent in the profession of photography,8 1 but
to the extent that it is required for art photographers like diCorcia, it
is not always feasible.
C. The Realm of Child Pornography
A third pertinent area of law outside of obscenity, and perhaps
the one that most clearly shows a bias against photography due to its
inherent nature, is that of child pornography. Much of the literature
75.
76.

SONTAG, supra note 63, at 115.
Nussenzweig, No. 108446/05, slip op. 50171(U) at *7.

77.
E.g., Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964); see DU VERNET, supra note 62, at 67-68
(detailing case law that reflects the notion that even in public, a person's dignity may be

violated and therefore deserve the protection of privacy laws).
78.
See Du VERNET, supra note 62, at 67-68.
79.

See CAVALLO & KAHAN, supra note 60, at 46.

80.
See id.
81.
See, e.g., id. at 46-56 (providing detailed practical information and sample
releases for the professional commercial photographer, noting that use of a release is a
matter of good business practice in the field); Du VERNET, supra note 62, at 110-19
(offering advice to the professional photographer on how to obtain a release, what it should
say, and what issues may arise from it, and warning that any photographer who
anticipates use of a photograph for commercial purposes must obtain a release).
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surrounding the specific connection between photography and
obscenity frames the issue with respect to child pornography rather
than general artistic photography.8 2 Indeed, child pornography is
perhaps the one area in which it is least disputed that8 3certain
photographs are inappropriate, harmful, offensive, and illegal.
It is important to note, however, that child pornography laws
constitute a set of laws distinct from obscenity law. While child
pornography laws seek mainly to protect the subject, obscenity laws
primarily protect the audience. In one sense, obscenity laws are more
expansive than child pornography laws, in that the former applies to a
wider variety of works, while the latter focuses exclusively on pictures
- either photographic or live.8 4 In another sense, child pornography
laws are more expansive than obscenity laws in that the Miller
standard, including the third "value" prong, is completely irrelevant to
the determination of whether something constitutes child
pornography.8 5 Child pornography can therefore be banned even if it
86
is not defined as obscene under Miller.
In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court stated that the
Miller standard is not a "satisfactory solution to the child pornography
problem" because "a work which . . . contains serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest core
of child pornography."8 7 The Court further emphasized that child
See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Regulating Sexual Images on the Web: Last Call for
82.
Miller Time, But New Issues Remain Untapped, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 507
(2001); Dannielle Cisneros, "Virtual Child" Pornography on the Internet: A "Virtual"
Victim?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19; Jasmin J. Farhangian, A Problem of "Virtual"
Proportions: The Difficulties Inherent in Tailoring Virtual Child PornographyLaws to Meet
ConstitutionalStandards, 12 J.L. & POLY 241 (2003).
See Cisneros, supra note 82, at 1 ("Most people would agree that the use of
83.
actual children in the production of sexually explicit videos or photographs is grotesque
child abuse."). But see Calvert, supra note 82, at 533-36 (highlighting the work of David
Hamilton, which features photographs of pubescent girls, as representative of a new gray
area of artistic photography that makes it "very difficult, under current laws, to distinguish
between illegal child pornography and protected art").
84.
This limitation on the scope of media subject to child pornography laws is
reminiscent of the earlier discussion on the power of the image and initial hurdles to equal
protection for all visual imagery. See supra Part I.A; Adler, Art of Censorship, supra note
1, at 210 (observing that the preference for First Amendment protection over text prevails
in child pornography law in that the laws only include specific types of images).
85.
Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-61 (1982) ("The Miller standard, like
all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's
particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual
exploitation of children.").
Id.
86.
Id. at 761 (stating also that the Miller test "bears no connection to the issue of
87.
whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of a
work").
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pornography laws should be limited exclusively to photographs and
live performances or visual reproductions of live performances, noting
that the "distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual
conduct [of children], not otherwise obscene . . . retains First
Amendment protection."8 8 The rationale was that it is only in
photography and film that there would be a true exploitation of the
child, since the resulting photograph or video reveals that there was
an actual child used in the work itself, whereas with other mediums,
there may have been no actual child involved.8 9 This is a prime
example of an area where the law clearly distinguishes between
photography and other forms of art.
The need to approach photography differently than other forms
of media in the area of child pornography also presents itself clearly in
the more recent Supreme Court case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition.90
The issue in this case was whether "virtual child"
pornography, involving completely fictional subjects where no actual
child was used in the production process, was criminal under child
pornography laws. 91 The Court stated that the government could not
criminalize such activity because it did not constitute sexual abuse of
any child. 92 While Congress, in direct response to the Court's decision,
proposed new legislation in an attempt to proscribe virtual child
pornography, 93 the approach by the Court on the issue is quite clear:
child pornography laws should remain true to Ferber's intent and be
limited to photographs or live productions or reproductions of actual
94
children.
The comparison of the Court's responses to virtual child
pornography and pornography involving actual children is analogous
to the distinction between a photograph and a painting. A painting
that does not involve a child model, but rather a child conjured up by
the artist's imagination, is "virtual." Only a photograph of a child
88.
Id. at 764-65.
89.
Cf. Cisneros, supra note 82, at
1 (noting the parallel rationale for "virtual
child" pornography).
90.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
91.
Id. at 239.
92.
Id. at 250 (opining that virtual child pornography is not "intrinsically related"

to the sexual abuse of children and is therefore distinguishable from actual child
pornography, and that the causal link between virtual child images and actual child abuse
is "contingent and indirect").
93.
See Farhangian, supra note 82, at 242-43, 272-76 (addressing the
constitutionality of Congress's recent attempts to ban virtual child pornography through
the Child Obscenity Pornography Prevention Act (COPPA) of 2002 and 2003 and the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Explotation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act).
94.
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250-51.
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model without dispute uses a real-life subject. Therefore, under child
pornography laws, a sexually explicit photograph depicting a minor is
considered criminal, whereas an alternative art form with a more
tenuous relationship to the minor subject is not. The basis of this
differential treatment-that a photograph is inherently more tangible
and true, ever filial to reality-brings the discussion back to the realm
of obscenity and lays the foundation for the final pieces of the puzzle
illustrating the artistic photographer's struggle with contemporary
obscenity standards.
D. Summary of Apparent Legal Biases Against Photography Outside of
Obscenity
As this article has shown, photography is initially
disadvantaged because it is a visual art and confronts the same
obstacles that other visual arts such as painting and sculpture face
with respect to First Amendment protection. However, it appears that
courts hold a special bias against photography as a distinct visual art
in areas such as copyright, privacy, and child pornography. Given this
distinct approach to photography in other areas of the law, it is
imaginable that this same bias might transfer to obscenity law. If
courts and audiences treat photography differently in copyright cases,
privacy cases, and child pornography cases, they very well may take a
distinct approach to photography in obscenity cases as well. This
projection is strengthened by photography's distinct characteristics
and its marginalization in art history as examined in the sections
below.

III. PHOTOGRAPHY'S MIXED FUNCTIONS AND THE MARGINALIZATION OF
PHOTOGRAPHY IN ART HISTORY

In addition to the initial proposition that photography receives
a lesser degree of First Amendment protection both because it is a
visual art and because evidence of discrimination against photography
exists in other areas of the law, photography faces an added layer of
obstacles to equal free speech protection. The difficulties that lie in
determining what constitutes art, and more specifically, what does
and does not have serious artistic value, are heightened by two factors
intrinsic to photography itself: the fact that photography serves
multiple non-artistic functions, and its marginalization by critics of
the medium due to the historic perception that a photograph is the
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"plastic verification of a fact" 95 and a mere product of a machine and
96
chemical process.
A photograph is very often used outside of the world of art for a
wide variety of purposes such as advertising, criminal evidence,
journalism, and science, to name a few. 97 An average person may
merely take a photograph in order to record memories and special
moments. These photographs may have no formal artistic intent
whatsoever. Photography in and of itself has never been, nor will
likely ever be, understood solely as "art" in the traditional sense. 98 Its
historical development simply did not take shape in such a way. 99 In
contrast, an oil painting, no matter how displeasing or avant-garde, is
still a piece of art. It enjoys a reputation as a traditional form of "art"
that photography does not.
This is not to say that more traditional kinds of art, such as
paintings and sculpture, have no function outside of the world of art.
However, the development of photography and its historically
standard classification as an "art-science" are surely distinct. 10 0 If
95.
Marius De Zayas, Photography and Phtography and Artistic-Photography, in
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 125, 125 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1980).
96.
See MARIEN, supra note 64, at 58-60.
97.
See SONTAG, supra note 63, at 5, 126 (introducing the early uses of photography
in modern states as surveillance and proof in evidence and discussing how early debates on
photography as art focused on whether it could distinguish itself from its other more
"practical" functions); JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION 60, 66-67 (1988)
(delineating the expansion of the photographic industry into advertising, journalism, and
the domestic market, and the use of photographs in medicine, evidence, and the growth of
the state); Lszl6 Moholy-Nagy, Photography in Advertising, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE
MODERN ERA 86, 86-93 (Christopher Phillips ed., 1989) (regarding photography as a
vehicle for transforming the modern viewpoint through fields such as advertising); Albert
Renger-Patzsch, Photographyand Art, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE MODERN ERA, supra, at
142, 142-43 (noting that modern life would be unthinkable without photography because of
its multitude of everyday functions, including its influence through film, the illustrated
press, and science); Farley, supra note 45, at 393 (discussing the cultural theory on
photography and the ways in which audiences might interpret a photograph in a museum
versus the same one used as evidence of a crime).
98.
See generally JOHN L. WARD, THE CRITICISM OF PHOTOGRAPHY As ART passim
(1970) (criticizing Pictorialism, a school of thought promoting the analysis of photography
as traditional art, for its claim that photographs can be judged by the same standard as
paintings, drawings, and prints, because the standard is not broad enough to fit all cases);
Erno Kallai, Paintingand Photography, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note
97, at 94, 94-99 (comparing painting and photography and expressing disappointment with
the mixture of art and mechanical technology).
See generally SONTAG, supra note 63.
99.
See, e.g., MARIEN, supra note 64, at 61-66 (describing the association of
100.
photography with progress in science and technology during the invention's first decade);
SONTAG, supra note 63, at 126 (stressing that the earliest controversies surrounding
photography concerned whether it could establish itself as "distinct from a merely practical
art, an arm of science, and a trade"); Peter Henry Emerson, Hints on Art, in CLASSIC
ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 95, at 99, 99 (criticizing those who define
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photography has uses outside of the world of art, 10 1 then the
distinction between "artistic" photography and "non-artistic"
photography is that much more confusing. As previously discussed,
the difficulties in defining art and evaluating a given work for its
"serious artistic value"'1 2 are far-reaching and problematic in and of
themselves. 103 With respect to photography, the proper determination
of whether a "reasonable person" would appreciate a photograph as
serious art 0 4 is further burdened by the multi-functional nature of the
medium itself.
Although today photography is generally accepted as a branch
of high art, historically it has been marginalized as a lesser art form
compared to more traditional forms of art.0 5 This marginalization is,
in a sense, intuitive: practically anyone can take a photograph. It
involves, in the most primitive sense, the clicking of a button. While
today a majority of the population would recognize that even though
nearly anyone can take a photograph, not anyone can be a professional
art photographer. However, an artist's sexually explicit photograph
that defies aesthetic and more widely-accepted technical standards in
the Post-Modernist fashion may still be denied any recognition of
serious artistic value. In applying Pope's reasonable person standard
to the value prong of the obscenity test, 10 6 the relative ease of taking a
photograph comes into play. If a sexually explicit photograph does not
look like "art" in the intuitive aesthetic sense, and it is much easier to
photography as mere art-science and recommending varied analyses for artistic, scientific,
and commercial photography); Erno Kallai, PictorialPhotography, in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE
MODERN ERA, supra note 97, at 116, 116 (noting the frequent formula of comparison
between painting as a "personal and psychological encapsulation of form" and photography
as the "outcome of a mechanical and chemical process").
101.
See DU VERNET, supra note 62, at 74-109 (summarizing for the professional
photographer the relevant legal issues that affect uses of photography in areas such as
advertising, news, court, and professional competitions); MARIEN, supra note 64, at 45
("The lack of any sure definition of [photography] proved to be ... a benefit. Photography
could be simultaneously ... art and science ....
The public experience of photographs in
family life, commerce, government, war, education, science, and art became comprehensible
through an open, malleable systems of ideas ....
).
102.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
103.
See supra Part I.B.
104.
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
105.
See generally SONTAG, supra note 63, at 115-149 (providing an intriguing
discourse on the relation of photography to art and knowledge and outlining the various
ways photography as a form of art defended itself); Kallai, supra note 100, at 117-18
(comparing a photographic still life to a similar painting and finding that the photograph
was inferior from a technical standpoint and generally more limited as a visual medium);
Renger-Patzsch, supra note 97, at 142 ('There was a time when one looked over one's
shoulder with an ironical smile at the photographer, and when photography as a profession
seemed almost invariably a target for ridicule.").
106.
Pope, 481 U.S. at 500-01.
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snap a picture rather than to paint one, is it really art? Does the
inherent automatism of photography somehow render it less deserving
of serious artistic value? A version of this thought process may very
well enter a juror's mind, particularly if the photographic work does
not appeal to traditional aesthetic notions of beauty or reflect an
10 7
established technical prowess.
Following its invention in 1839, photography as a form of fine
art was attacked for a relatively short period of time.10 8 However, the
defenses brought forth in response lend insight into the special nature
of photography, as exemplified by American commentator Susan
Sontag's observation that "[a]gainst the charge that photography was
a soulless, mechanical copying of reality, photographers asserted that
it was a vanguard revolt against ordinary standards of seeing, no less
worthy an art than painting." 10 9
Indeed, the very basis for a modern-day juror's tendency to
perceive a photograph as lacking serious artistic value replicates the
early criticism that photography was a mechanical rather than artistic
endeavor.11 0 The automatism of photography, the relative ease of
taking a photograph, and its dependence on a machine made critics
suspicious of its artistic value. '
As English critic John Ruskin
lamented regarding the invasion of photography into the realm of art
and the emergence of a modern era obsessed with speed and efficiency,
"[n]ext, you will have steam organs and singers, and turn on your
cathedral service. 1 12
Throughout the course of photography's development in art
history, practitioners themselves felt pressure to defend their work
and prove its value. The influential nineteenth and twentieth-century
107.
Cf. Hess, supra note 36, at 11-12 (relaying how the defense's art expert
convinced the jury that Robert Mapplethorpe's works were not obscene because of their
formalist qualities).
While the defense's art expert in the famous trial of Robert
Mapplethorpe may have convinced the jury of the works' serious artistic value using an
analysis based on artistic technique, the question is whether an artist attempting to push
drastically the limits of photography as art by disregarding current considerations of
technique would automatically be accused of producing pornography because the
reasonable person might be influenced by the ease with which a photograph is taken and
subsequently dismiss the work for any artistic value.
108.
SONTAG, supra note 63, at 115 ("The era in which photography was widely
attacked (as parricidal with respect to painting, predatory with respect to people) was a
brief one. . . . [B]y 1854 a great painter, Delacroix, graciously declared how much he
regretted that such an admirable invention came so late.").
109.
Id. at 126.
110.
See MARIEN, supra note 64, at 45-60 (describing early criticism of photography).
111.
See id. at 58-60. Photography was further marginalized in relation to other preexisting forms of art because many of the artists who adopted photography and "jumped
ship were seen as second-rate artists to begin with." Farley, supra note 45, at 419.
112.
MARIEN, supranote 64, at 59.
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artistic photographer Alfred Stieglitz initially took on an additional
interest in painting in part because he feared that there was not
113
enough good photography to fill his magazine and gallery.
However, as an avid leader in the movement for recognition of
photography as a valid art form, he believed that exhibiting paintings
and photographs side-by-side might help define photography more
114
effectively and help it rise to an equal status among the arts.
In sum, artistic photographers have struggled to find their
place in the world of art. While few today would dispute that
photography can be an art, this unique medium has not enjoyed the
same treatment as other forms of art as shown by its troubled history.
Considering the marginalization of photography in art history and its
multi-functionality, it is likely that courts and public audiences will
struggle in their determination of the serious artistic value of sexually
explicit photographic works to a greater degree than they would for
other forms of art that do not share the same history and reputation.
IV. OBSCENITY AND THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: PHOTOGRAPHY'S
INHERENT NATURE AND THE CAPTURING OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH

There are a number of reasons that courts and audiences are
more likely to find sexually explicit photographs to be obscene
according to the Miller test. This may be because of its multifunctionality and historic marginalization as an art form, or because
of evidence that courts treat photography differently in a number of
areas outside of obscenity law. But, perhaps most intuitively, it may
be because a photograph is perceived as capturing something real.
The objectivity of photography and its "fidelity to
appearances" ' 5 relates back to this article's examination of the
marginalization of photography as art. 1 6 While that discussion
focused on the effects that the ease of taking a photograph and the
multi-functionality of photography had on the third prong of Miller,
the discussion at hand focuses on the first two prongs of Miller: those
relating to the "prurient interest" and whether the work exhibits
sexual conduct in a "patently offensive" way." 7 The argument here is

113.

See Sarah Greenough, Alfred Stieglitz, Rebellious Midwife to a Thousand Ideas,

in MODERN ART AND AMERICA: ALFRED STIEGLITZ AND HIs NEW YORK GALLERIES 23, 27

(Sarah Greenough ed., 2000).
114.
Id.; see also MICHAEL NORTH, CAMERA WORKS: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE
TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORD 35 (2005).
115.
SONTAG, supra note 63, at 126.

116.
117.

See discussion supra Part III.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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that the myth of photographic realism leads to a higher likelihood that
a sexually explicit photograph will be deemed to satisfy these two
prongs of Miller.118 This analysis thereby completes the proposition
that photography's inherent nature has a restrictive effect with
respect to each element of the Miller obscenity test. 1 9
Photography's dependence on machinery was only part of the
reason that critics scoffed at its value as art. 20 The other part
consisted of the assertion that a photograph simply reflected reality
and was therefore not an expression of personality or human soul on
the part of the artist.' 2' Under this belief, photography was inferior
to, or less artistic than, painting and other traditional forms of art,
and artists and critics were quick to lament the permeation of the new
invention into the field of art. 122 A photograph merely re-presented
nature, and its verisimilitude made it transparent and less worthy of
artistic acclaim. 123 Deemed "the pencil of nature,"' 24 photography was
seen as deplorably plagiaristic of reality; a photograph's sole merit
25
was its accuracy, nothing more.
It is precisely this understanding of photography's ability to
capture reality and to offer an exact duplication of objects and scenes
that informs the perception of sexually explicit photographs as
obscene (or, at least, offensive). In the eyes of a viewer, photography
is the one medium that can accomplish this duplication of reality and

118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
See MARIEN, supra note 64, at 58-59.
121.
See id. (quoting Ruskin that photographs "supersede no single quality nor use
of fine art" because they have so much in common with nature and in turn reflect no
"human labor regulated by human design," which Ruskin labeled the definition of art);
WARD, supra note 98, at 3 (considering how the immense "sense of reality behind the
photograph" causes people to perceive photographs as "invisible windows with no intrinsic
character").
122.
See MARIEN, supra note 64, at 58 (noting Ruskin's early adoration of
photography but subsequent disdain of it in its relation to art, when he expressed that
when it came to art, he wished photography "had never been discovered"); Farley, supra
note 45, at 417 (framing French painter Paul Delaroche's exclamation "From this day,
painting is dead!" in response to photography's invention as evidence of his and other
artists' fear of the new medium).
123.

See generally JOHN TAGG, GROUNDS OF DISPUTE: ART HISTORY, CULTURAL

POLITICS, AND THE DISCURSIVE FIELD 125 (1992) (analyzing that the "conception of the
photograph as a mechanised, automatic product evokes not futuristic fantasy, but the
contempt of a Romantic theory of culture, which sees art as the elite and manly expression
of a given human spirit").
124.

WILLIAM HENRY FOX TALBOT, THE PENCIL OF NATURE (Da Capo Press 1969)

(1846).
125.
See Farley, supra note 45, at 396, 416-19 (explaining how photography was
initially understood and the origins of artists' reactions to photography upon its invention).
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therefore it has a dangerously powerful effect. 126 As Sontag writes,
"[p]hotography furnishes evidence. Something we hear about, but
doubt, seems proven when we're shown a photograph of it."127
This perception and understanding of photography was what
justified the Supreme Court's continued support of Ferber in its
limitation of the application of child pornography laws to actual
photographs or videos of real children. 128
The objectivity of a
photograph makes the subject more real to the viewer, and the mental
association of the final product with the subject invokes a specific
reaction. In the area of child pornography, that reaction often results
in disgust. But the same line of reasoning transfers to the realm of
obscenity. Depictions of sexual conduct between individuals or the
"lewd exhibition of the genitals"' 29 through photography has a higher
tendency to offend because it represents an actual person committing
the act. When the viewer completes the mental processing of the
image and conceptualizes its close relation to life, it becomes more
"hard core."
This builds upon the earlier assertion regarding
photography's initial obstacle to First Amendment protection as a
30
visual image.
The perception that photography blatantly duplicates reality
thus proves to be a double-edged sword: it hinders the photograph's
ability to possess serious artistic value in order to garner First
Amendment protection, but it also makes the photograph more real for
purposes of satisfying the prurient interest and patently offensive
prongs of the Miller test.' 3 1 Even if a sexually explicit photograph is
considered "aesthetic" or in some other way deserving of distinction as
art, the question remains whether it is serious art, and the problem
that an average viewer naturally associates sexual connotations with
the mere image of a nude persists. 3 2 This opens up the possibility

126.
See Thierry de Duve, Time Exposure and Snapshot: The Photograph as
Paradox,5 OCTOBER 113, 119-21 (1978) (analyzing photography as a distinct art form and
how its inherent characteristics render it "traumatic" to the viewer); cf. WARD, supra note
98, at 2-3 (emphasizing that because of photography's ability to render detail and the
perception that it records reality, people are so caught up with the subject matter of a
photograph so as not to pay attention to the technical or artistic nature of the photograph).
127.
SONTAG, supra note 63, at 5.
128.
See supra Part II.C.
129.
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (providing examples of what a
state statute could define as "sexual conduct" for purposes of the second prong of the test).
130.
See supra Part I.A.
131.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
132.

See ARTHUR GOLDSMITH, THE NUDE IN PHOTOGRAPHY 28-29 (1975) (suggesting

that successful nude photographs can satisfy both aesthetic and sexual appetites
simultaneously); LOU JACOBS JR., EXPRESSIVE PHOTOGRAPHY 193 (1979) (cautioning both
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that the work is obscene. In sum, photography's mechanically truthful
nature is detrimental to the freedom of sexually explicit art
photographers with respect to each element of the Miller obscenity

standard. 133
The effect of photography's objective nature and its connection
to the individual subject of the photograph were relevant in the
previous discussions on privacy and child pornography.13 4 Under the
purview of obscenity, the realness of a photograph and its attachment
to the subject make the work more likely to be perceived as realistic,
shocking, striking and, as a result, more "patently offensive." 135
Moreover, to the "average person" applying "contemporary community
standards," these distinct characteristics - ones that simply cannot
exist in painting, drawing or sculpture in the way they do in
photography - render the work more likely to appeal to the "prurient
interest."136 As Sontag points out, "[w]hile a painting, even one that
meets photographic standards of resemblance, is never more than the
stating of an interpretation, a photograph is never less than the
registering of an emanation. . . - a material vestige of its subject in a
way that no painting can be." 137
The impact of photography's inherently objective qualities on
satisfying the elements of an obscenity claim is evident not only in
modern discourses on photography and certain case law, 138 but also in
our culture of consumption. After all, modern popular pornography
exists primarily in the form of photography or film. One could venture
to say that consumers of pornography may prefer photographs to
drawings or paintings. The latter are less satisfying because they do
not seem as realistic. To many consumers of pornography, a sexual

the amateur and professional photographer of the natural association of the nude to
sexuality and the need to "deal[ ] with this reality").
133.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
134.
See supra Part II.B-C.
135.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
136.
Id. (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)).
137.
SONTAG, supra note 63, at 154. Though paintings of the realist movement such
as Edouard Manet's "Olympia" and Gustave Courbet's 'L'origine du Monde" were shocking
in their day, it is arguable still that these paintings were not as literal to the viewer as a
photograph would be.
138.
Compare Miller v. United States, 431 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding a
forty-eight page publication featuring nude photographs of the same female model
obscene), and People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (1951) (ruling that the mailed
works in question had no redeeming artistic value because they were not even "good"
photographs), with City of St. George v. Turner, 813 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1991) (deciding
that spray-painted drawings representing genitalia were too amorphous, abstract, and
"crudely rendered" to be patently offensive or to appeal to the prurient interest).
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fantasy still requires an element of reality.13 9 This preference makes
the line between sexually explicit photography as art and sexually
explicit photography as obscenity ever more blurred. It is a dilemma
that plagues the art photographer to a far greater extent than the
painter or other more traditional artist.140
The notion of photographic realism, however, is somewhat a
myth, given both the development of photography into an accepted
fine art and its close relationship with technology.
Historically,
photographers tried to mimic the technical and artistic styles of
paintings in order to earn recognition as a worthy art. 141 During the
reign of Pictorialism in the latter half of the nineteenth century, art
photographers felt the need to adopt an abstract, painter-like
approach to their work in order to obtain legitimacy in the world of
fine art. 142 Pictorialists believed that the artistic photograph should
be judged using the same principles as those used to judge other
artistic media. 43 To make photographs appear more like paintings,
art photographers often manipulated images by hand, deliberately
making them blurred and abstract, or applied other technical
modifications such as a softer focus and backlighting to achieve a
painting-like result. 44 Early photographers of the nude made use of
similar techniques, including use of veils and impersonal poses, in
139.

Cf. Ruth Barcan, In the Raw: "Home-Made"Porn and Reality Genres, J.

MUNDANE BEHAV., June 2002, http://www.mundanebehavior.org/issues/v3nl/barcan.htm
(exploring the growing taste for "reality" pornography created through such means as
home-made pornography, which focuses on the more ordinary image of the body that is real
and realizable).
140.
See Nicola Beisel, Morals Versus Art: Censorship, The Politics of Interpretation
and the Victorian Nude, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 145, 151-52 (1993) (discussing the
marginalization of photography by way of photographic reproductions of painted works and
quoting common attitudes that the increasing popularity throughout history of colored
photographs of pictures was "not altogether due to an increasing love and appreciation of
art," but rather to a baser desire). The significance of photographic reproductions on the
marginalization of photography is also interesting in its relation to the notion that a
photograph cheapens the value of a work by making it more accessible to the masses.
Throughout history, certain classical nude paintings were legal and classified as pure
nudes rather than impure ones, but photographic reproductions of the same works were
ruled obscene. This "cheapening" through reproduction renders the work sordid and
obscene. American artists and critics, as with their French counterparts, rarely recognized
paintings of a nude as impure, further highlighting the general respect a painting received
as a traditional art form and the disdain of photography as a lesser art. See generally id.;
Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in MODERN ART
AND MODERNISM 217 (Francis Frascina & Charles Harrison, eds., 1982); Shayana Kadidal,
Obscenity in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 353, 373 (1996).
141.
See Farley, supra note 45, at 419-25.
142.
See id. at 421-22; NORTH, supra note 114, at 17.
143.
See NORTH, supra note 114, at 17.
144.
Farley, supra note 45, at 421.
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order to avoid sexuality in the same way paintings and sculptures
45
traditionally mythologized and idealized the classic nude.1
These attempts to render photography more similar to
traditional forms of art, later discouraged by Purists and Photo
Secessionists in a subsequent movement, 146 demonstrate the lengths
taken by early art photographers to overcome stigma and achieve
validation. Perhaps more significantly, however, the efforts of early
photographers indicate that photography is not always literal and that
it has never been solely literal.14 7 Never could this be more true than
it is in today's era of digital photography. As technology continues to
advance, allowing for the drastic alteration of images, be it on the
computer or in the darkroom, the notion that all photography is by its
nature a duplication of reality is simply not true. As such, modern
courts, jurors, and audiences should question their reactions to a
sexually explicit photograph to the extent that they perceive it
differently than they may perceive a painting, drawing, or other
traditional medium.
V. LOOKING FORWARD: STRIVING FOR AN EQUAL OBSCENITY STANDARD
AND THE LIMITS ON EXPANDED FREEDOM FOR THE ART PHOTOGRAPHER

In order to overcome a negative bias against the freedom of
photographers
with respect to producing
sexually explicit
photographs, one solution is for courts, jurors, and other audiences to
be more cognizant of the myth of photographic realism. Part of that
knowledge would involve a more ready realization that photographs
do not always reflect reality and can be altered and recreated at the
artist's whim just like a painting, virtual digital image, drawing, or
145.
JACOBS, supra note 132, at 187.
146.
See WARD, supra note 98, at 17 (discussing the Purist's championing of
objective realism and belief that "a photograph should be true to the nature of its
medium"); Renger-Patzsch, supra note 97, at 142-44 (encouraging photographers to reject
the abstract form of modern painters and to instead embrace the visual realism that
belongs exclusively to photography); Philippe Soupault, The Present State of Photography,
in PHOTOGRAPHY IN THE MODERN ERA, supra note 97, at 50, 50-51 (encouraging

photographers to "forget art" and to pursue and explore photography as its own medium);
Farley, supra note 45, at 422 (explaining how the Photo Secessionists "rallied against" the
Pictorialists at the turn of the century, but that the movement away from manipulative
and painterly approaches was "embraced... more in theory than in practice").
147.
The famous war photographs of Mathew Brady and Alexander Gardner during
the Civil War era further reflect the ability of the camera to reflect a modified version of
reality. See ALEXANDER GARDNER, PHOTOGRAPHIC SKETCHBOOK OF THE CIVIL WAR (Dover

Publications, Inc. 1957) (1865). In order to create a story and evoke emotion with a
photograph, these photographers sometimes "created" a scene by posing bodies. See Does
the Camera Ever Lie?, Civil War Photographs, http://memory.loc.gov/ammemlcwphtml/
cwpcam/cwcaml.html (last visited September 21, 2006).
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sculpture. Yet this revised outlook on photography lends itself to an
alternative problem: the implicit requirement that a photograph
somehow purposely possess an abstract or aesthetic quality.
As applied to modern obscenity law, it seems that the
Pictorialist approach would have shielded many sexually explicit
The more abstract,
photographs from being deemed obscene. 148
indistinct, and unreal a work of art is, the less likely it will satisfy the
"prurient interest" and "patently offensive" prongs of Miller. 49 Along
the same line, it is arguable that the more abstract, aesthetic, and
painting-like a work, the more likely it is for a jury to find that it has
serious artistic value and that it thus deserves First Amendment
This brings into focus the question of whether
protection.15 0
photographs that are sexually explicit must somehow possess a special
abstract aesthetic quality in order to be considered less offensive or
obscene and more artistic. In addition to the "formalistic" opposing
of Robert
compositions
"almost classical"
and
diagonals
Mapplethorpe's photographs, for example, many of his most
controversial works were also shown as black and white photography,
making it arguably less real, and perhaps more "artsy," than colored
photography. 15' Indeed, the historical marginalization of photography
based on treatment of colored photographic reproductions focused on
the notion that colored photographs might have a certain cheapening
152
effect and also appeal to a baser, more "prurient" interest.
Does this mean that an art photographer whose work features
a sexually explicit subject, such as a nude, in a potentially obscene
way should put forth an extra effort to make the work look more
"artistic," perhaps by using a more classical composition, smudging
and blurring outlines, using a softer focus, making it less true to
reality - all the things that the Pictorialists felt the need to do and
that the Purists advised against? 153 Surely, a painter was never forced
to use black and white paint in order to make his painting of a
provocative nude appear more "artistic," less "real," and therefore less
obscene.

148.
See discussion supra Part IV.
149.
See City of St. George v. Turner, 813 P.2d 1188, 1189 (Utah 1991) (placing
graffiti art outside the realm of obscenity because it was too "blurry and indistinct" to be
patently offensive or appeal to the prurient interest).
150.
See Hess, supra note 36, at 111 (relaying the art expert's appreciation of the
formalistic lines and shadows of Mapplethorpe's photographs as warranting the work's
serious artistic value).
151.
See id.
152. See supra note 140.
153. See discussion supra Part IV.
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The dilemma as to whether modern-day art photographers
have to make their work more "beautiful" or "artistic" in order to
escape obscenity charges surfaced in classic form again in the Ninth
Circuit case Miller v. United States.154 In this case, the court
emphasized that the lack of any "attempt at artistic composition either
in background, surroundings or poses" justified finding that the work
was obscene. 155 Yet, going back to the initial problems of defining art
and artistic value, what does "good photography"'156 really mean, and
who decides? And, again, what of the Post-Modern art photographer
whose purpose is to defy all classical technique and traditional
standards, perhaps by deliberately taking the Purist's approach to
artistic photography to an extreme? Would the product be protected
art, or unprotected obscenity? These are all problems that continually
limit the freedom of the photographer, particularly the photographer
who chooses as part of his or her art to exhibit more literally sexual
conduct, in producing sexually explicit photographic images for the
sake of art.
VI. CONCLUSION

Ideally, art photographers should not be restricted in their
freedom of speech merely because of inherent biases and
preconceptions regarding their chosen medium. However, the power
of the photographic image, the indefiniteness of what constitutes art
and what warrants serious artistic value, the multitude of functions
outside of art associated with photography, the historical
marginalization of photography as art, the biases against the medium
exhibited in distinct areas of the law, and its perceived accuracy as a
vehicle for an objective reality all result in a profound and seemingly
inescapable impact on the art photographer.
Audiences are not yet at a point in which they automatically
assume that a photograph may not actually reflect reality, or that it is
unfair that the art photographer, and not the painter or sculptor, be
subjected to prejudicial notions about the medium. While there are no
easy practical solutions, continued art education and increased public
awareness of artistic media and the movements associated with them
may induce audiences to view all art more openly. Despite efforts to
fix and define what is and is not obscene through a rigid legal rubric
in the form of the Miller test, obscenity prosecutions, from a realistic

154.

431 F.2d 655, 655 (9th Cir. 1970).

155.

Id. at 658.

156.

See People v. Gonzales, 107 N.Y.S.2d 968, 968 (1951).
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standpoint, are still intrinsically linked to contemporary societal views
and norms. Until the judge, the juror, the public viewers, and critics
of artistic photography embrace the critical nuances in the
relationship between photography and obscenity, the art photographer
will likely continue to struggle, to a greater extent than other artists,
in the face of the nation's inadequate standards on obscenity.

